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COMMENT 
 
An End to Grazing Lease Litigation:  
An Examination of  
Alternative Dispute Resolution Schemes  
that Could Resolve the Overgrazing Dispute  
on State and Federally Owned Rangelands  
in the Western United States 
JAMIE RYAN POOL∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Ranching of cattle and other animals in the western United 
States (U.S.) has traditionally been considered the “backbone” of 
many rural areas and communities.1  Ranchers have grazed their 
livestock on vast rangelands since the 1500s in the southwestern 
U.S. and since the 1800s elsewhere in the West.2  Until 1891, the 
federal government primarily sought to “dispose” of public lands 
through “[giving] or [selling] millions of acres of the public 
domain to homesteaders, railroads, and new states, among 
others.”3  Even with this disposal of lands, a rancher could 
generally graze his livestock wherever he wished, as long as it 
was on public land.4  In 1934, Congress passed the Taylor 
Grazing Act,5
 
∗  Jamie Ryan Pool is a 2011 J.D./M.E.M. joint-degree candidate attending 
Pace Law School and Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. This 
article is dedicated to the memory of his stepmother, Cindy Pool. 
 which regulated grazing on public rangeland by 
requiring that ranchers first obtain exclusive grazing permits for 
 1. Julie Andersen, Note, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt: Herding Ranchers 
Off Public Land?, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1273 (2000). 
 2. Bruce M. Pendery, Reforming Livestock Grazing on the Public Domain: 
Ecosystem Management-Based Standards and Guidelines Blaze a New Path for 
Range Management, 27 ENVTL. L. 513, 515 (1997). 
 3. Id. at 519. 
 4. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1273. 
 5. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (2006). 
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portions of federal land.6  The Taylor Grazing Act, along with the 
later Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19767 and the 
Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978,8 granted the 
Secretary of the Interior the authority to develop and promulgate 
these regulations on public rangeland.9
In the western U.S., ranching often requires large areas of 
public rangeland because landowners collectively own only a 
small portion of each state as private property.  As a result, 
ranchers often lease or obtain permits for additional portions of 
public rangeland to augment the land area that will support their 
livestock.  As of January 1, 2006, in Arizona for example, 86% of 
the state was suitable for livestock grazing and only 16% of this 
land was privately owned.
 Because of the former 
federal land disposal policy and the later regulation of grazing on 
public land, modern grazing generally takes two different forms: 
(1) grazing on state owned land; and (2) grazing on federal land 
administered by the Bureau of Land Management or the U.S. 
Forest Service. 
10  However, in order to increase 
profitability and compete with others, ranchers have tended to 
increase their herd sizes to the point that they overgraze and 
damage the rangeland ecosystem.11  Consequently, public land’s 
ability to sustain native flora and fauna has decreased.12  
Environmental organizations, observing this decline in the 
ecosystem, argue that grazing causes significant environmental 
damage.  They want livestock either removed from public land 
that has been overgrazed or at least reduced in number.13
 
 6. Andersen, supra note 
  On 
both state and federally owned rangeland, environmental 
1, at 1273. 
 7. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1785 (2006). 
 8. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 
(2006). 
 9. See generally Pendery, supra note 2, at 515, 519-22. 
 10. ARIZ. COOP. EXTENSION, COLL. OF AGRIC. & LIFE SCIS., UNIV. OF ARIZ., BEEF 
CATTLE ON ARIZ. RANGELANDS: RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND FACILITIES DEDICATED 
TO PRODUCING WHOLESOME FOOD 4 (2007), http://cals.arizona.edu/ 
extension/marketing/outreach_materials/beef_cattle.pdf. 
 11. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing, 
http://www.onda.org/protecting-wildlife-and-clean-water/public-lands-grazing 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1274. 
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organizations have pursued a strategy of both participation in 
grazing lease auctions and, when that does not work, litigation to 
remove or reduce livestock from public land.14  This litigation has 
tended to be time-consuming, is costly to the administrative 
agencies managing public lands,15 and has created an extremely 
hostile public and legislative reaction to the environmental 
organizations and their interests.16
This comment will discuss the litigation associated with 
environmental organizations’ attempts to out-bid ranchers and 
ranching associations for public grazing leases on state and 
federally owned rangeland in the western U.S.  Section II of this 
comment will examine the history of state and federally owned 
rangeland and its auction process.  Section III will discuss several 
environmental organizations and their interests in rangeland 
protection, and Section IV will describe the grazing lease 
litigation problem in detail.  Section V will analyze the negative 
legislative and agency reactions to environmental organizations’ 
legal victories.  Finally, in Section VI, this comment will propose 
state and federal legislation and agency regulatory changes 
designed to encourage the adoption of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques to reduce or eliminate western grazing 
lease litigation. 
 
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PUBLIC GRAZING 
LAND 
There is a great deal of public rangeland throughout the 
western U.S. that is used by ranchers and ranching associations 
to graze livestock.  The U.S. granted some of this rangeland to 
individual states when they were admitted into the Union.  The 
 
 14. See Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001); Idaho Watersheds 
Project v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 918 P.2d 1206 (Idaho 1996) [hereinafter 
IWP I] (illustrating representative grazing rights litigation). 
 15. See Stacey Allison, Comment, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold: Impl-
ications for Leasing State Trust Lands to Environmental Organizations and 
Other High Bidders, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 39, 49-50 (2004). 
 16. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS: FOREST GUARDIANS SETS ITS 
SIGHT ON NORTHEASTERN ARIZONA STATE GRAZING LEASE—SAYS IT WILL NOT PAY 
FOR IMPROVEMENTS THAT WERE NOT PAID FROM PERSONAL FUNDS (2008), 
http://www.azcattlemensassoc.org/documentz/apr2008/KnightsGrazingLawsuitL
ong.pdf [herinafter ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N BIDDING WARS]. 
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federal government owns the rest, which is administered by 
various federal agencies. 
A.  State Managed Rangeland 
It was federal policy to dispose of public domain land until 
1891,17 when the federal government shifted to retaining much of 
it for internal management and administration.18  When 
expanding the Union westward, Congress had to determine 
whether the federal government or new state governments should 
retain ownership of the public domain land comprising much of 
the western territories.19  In the end, millions of acres of public 
domain land were granted to the new states so that any sale or 
lease revenues generated from them would support the 
establishment and maintenance of state public schools.20
In Arizona, state owned rangeland is any land entrusted to 
the state under the Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act (Enabling 
Act).
  Two 
states in particular are home to prodigious litigation by 
environmental organizations regarding grazing leases on these 
school lands—Arizona and Idaho. 
21  As mentioned above, Congress reserved much of this land 
to support state public schools.22 Historically, Arizona 
accomplished this objective through the sale or auction of grazing 
leases on the land.23  The Enabling Act prohibited any sale or 
lease of the school-trust land unless it was to the “highest and 
best bidder at a public auction.”24
 
 17. Pendery, supra note 
  In light of the dissipation of 
2, at 519. 
 18. Id. at 520. 
 19. See Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act, 61st Cong., ch. 310, §§ 24-25, 28, 
36 Stat. 557, 572-76 (1910) (amended by New Mexico Statehood and Enabling 
Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-37, 111 Stat. 1113 (1997)); see also An 
Act To Provide For The Admission Of The State Of Idaho Into The Union, 51st 
Cong., 656-57 (1890) (no current effective sections). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act, 61st Cong., ch. 310, §§ 24-25, 28, 36 
Stat. 557, 572-76 (1910), amended by New Mexico Statehood and Enabling Act 
Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-37, 111 Stat. 1113 (1997). 
 22. Id. § 25. 
 23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-132(A)(5)-(6) (2008). 
 24. Arizona New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 557, 574 (1910), 
amended by New Mexico Statehood and Enabling Act Amendments of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-37, 111 Stat. 1113 (1997). 
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land assets granted to other states after their admission into the 
Union,25 Congress specifically wrote the Enabling Act so that it 
would “severely circumscribe the power of the state government 
to deal with the assets of the common school trust.”26  Members of 
Congress were upset that corrupt state legislatures had 
permitted the disposal of school lands in ways that did not raise 
the money necessary to support public schools.27  The Arizona 
Constitution adopted by reference large sections of the Enabling 
Act,28 and the Arizona Legislature drafted laws that provided for 
the administration of the school-trust lands by the Arizona State 
Land Department (SLD) pursuant to the Arizona Constitution.29
Under Section 37-102 of this legislation, the SLD was tasked 
with administering “all laws relating to lands owned by, 
belonging to, and under the control of the state.”
 
30  Therefore, the 
SLD is in charge of the school-trust land granted to the state 
under the Enabling Act.  In performing its administrative duties, 
the SLD subsequently classified much of the school-trust land as 
land suited only for grazing because it had “no other practicable 
use.”31  In order to support the public schools of Arizona, the SLD 
leases the land classified for grazing to ranchers through a public 
auction process, which raises revenue for the maintenance of the 
schools.32  The Commissioner of the SLD, as provided by statute, 
awards the leases to the “highest and best bidder.”33
Idaho state rangelands have a similar history to those of 
Arizona.  Congress granted these rangelands to Idaho in the 
Idaho Admission Act (Admission Act),
 
34
 
 25. Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 747 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Ariz. 1987). 
 mandating that the 
rangelands be “disposed of only at public sale, the proceeds to 
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. ARIZ. CONST. art. X, §§ 1-11. 
 29. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-102(A),(B),(F) (2008). 
 30. Id. § 37-102(A). 
 31. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 370-71 (Ariz. 2001) (citing ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 37-101(7) (2001), to define “grazing lands”). 
 32. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 366 (Ariz. 2001). 
 33. Id. at 371 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. X, § 8). 
 34. An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Idaho into the Union, 
51st Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 656-57, 26 Stat. 215, 216 (1890) (no current effective 
sections). 
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shall be expended in the support of said schools.”35  These lands 
could, however, be leased for ten-year periods.36  As in Arizona, 
the Idaho Constitution incorporated the school land grants 
specified in the Admission Act.37  Idaho man-dates that any 
earnings from the school-trust lands be used to maintain state 
schools.38  The Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners 
(SBLC), as provided for by Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution,39 
is charged with providing for “the location, protection, sale or 
rental of all the lands” of the public school land endowment.40
B.  Federally Managed Rangeland 
 
For grazing lease litigation purposes, federal public land can 
be divided into two general categories—that administered by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and that administered by 
the U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service).  The BLM is an 
administrative unit of the Department of the Interior,41 and the 
Forest Service is an administrative unit of the Department of 
Agriculture.42  Each agency is responsible for vast expanses of 
land owned by the federal government.43
The BLM is “responsible for the majority of federally-
managed rangeland,”
 
44 and even though some grazing occurs on 
National Forest System land, “grazing is most commonly 
associated with the BLM.”45
 
 35. Id. § 5. 
  The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 
(TGA) was the first federal legislation that substantially 
regulated grazing on most non-Forest Service federal public land.  
 36. Sally K. Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles As a Tool for Grazing 
Reform: Learning from Four State Cases, 33 ENVTL. L. 341, 360 (2003). 
 37. Id. at 359-60. 
 38. Id. 
 39. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 7. 
 40. Id. § 8. 
 41. Bureau of Land Management, About the BLM, Detailed History, BLM 
and Its Predecessors, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM/History. 
html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 42. U.S. Forest Service, About Us—Meet the Forest Service, http://www.fs. 
fed.us/aboutus/meetfs.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 43. Id. See also Bureau of Land Management, supra note 41. 
 44. Scott Nicoll, The Death of Rangeland Reform, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 47, 
61 (2006). 
 45. Id. 
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The TGA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to establish 
grazing districts46 and issue “permits to graze livestock on such 
grazing districts.”47  However, the regulation and adjudication 
processes under the TGA were unwieldy and somewhat limited 
the Act’s effectiveness.48  The Interior Department created the 
BLM itself in 1946 to streamline some of this regulation and 
adjudication.49
Thirty years later, Congress rectified some long-standing 
problems with the TGA by passing the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA)
 
50 to provide the BLM with the 
statutory authority to manage public rangeland within its 
jurisdiction similar to that enjoyed by the Forest Service.51  In 
addition, Congress required in FLPMA that the BLM manage 
public rangeland “under principles of multiple use and sustained 
yield”52 so that many types of scientific, recreational, and 
environmental non-use values could be protected.53
Concerned that FLPMA did not do enough to protect 
rangeland resources, Congress in 1978 enacted the Public 
Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA).
 
54  Under PRIA, Congress 
determined that “vast segments of the public rangelands [were] 
producing less than their potential for livestock, wildlife habitat, 
recreation, forage, and water and soil conservation benefits, and 
for that reason [were] in an unsatisfactory condition.”55
 
 46. Andersen, supra note 
  Congress 
then reaffirmed the national policy of managing, maintaining, 
and improving the condition of federal public rangelands so that 
they would “become as productive as feasible for all rangeland 
1, at 1274 (citing LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE 
WEST: PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING (1992)). 
 47. Id. at 1277. 
 48. See id. at 1278. 
 49. See Bureau of Land Management, supra note 41. 
 50. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C §§ 1701-1787 
(2006). 
 51. Andersen, supra note 1, at 1279. 
 52. 43 U.S.C § 1732(a) (2006). 
 53. Id. § (a)(8). 
 54. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 
(2006). 
 55. Id. § 1901(a)(1). 
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values in accordance with management objectives and the land 
use planning process established” under FLPMA.56
Forest Service rangeland, like that administered by the BLM, 
has a complicated regulatory history.  In 1891, Congress passed 
the Forest Reserve (Creative) Act,
 
57 which granted then-
President Harrison authority to establish Forest Reserves out of 
the public domain land.58  Harrison used the authority to reserve 
about thirteen million acres, although the designations only 
amounted to largely ceremonial map demarcations because 
Congress provided no funding for federal management.59  In 
1897, Congress finally provided this funding and stated that 
“[national forests shall not be established except to] protect the 
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing 
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous 
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the 
United States.”60  In 1905, Congress, at the urging of European-
trained forester Gifford Pinchot,61 “transferred the forest reserves 
to the Department of Agriculture, named them national forests, 
and created the Forest Service to manage them.”62  Under 
Pinchot,63 one of the Forest Service’s central purposes became the 
commercial sale of timber to avoid potential future timber 
shortages.64  The practice of encouraging commercial timber sales 
continued until 1960 when Congress passed the Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY).65
 
 56. Id. § 1901(b)(2). 
  MUSY was designed to promote 
the protection of “recreation, wildlife, and fish and range 
 57. Rebecca Smith, Lands Council v. Powell and the Ninth Circuit’s Refusal 
to Blindly Defer to Unreliable Forest Service Science, 28 PUB. LAND & RES. L. 
REV. 65, 69 (2007). 
 58. Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: 
Judicial Interpretation of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. 
REV. 53, 57 (1994). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Public Law Appropriations, Sundry Civil Lieu Lands Act (Forest 
Reservations), 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006). 
 61. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 58. 
 62. Id. at 57-58; Transfer Act of 1905, ch. 288, § 1, 33 Stat. 628 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 472 (2006)). 
 63. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 58. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2006). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/10
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resources” in addition to general timber management.66  In 1976, 
Congress passed the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).67  
Under NFMA, Congress required that the Forest Service begin a 
“nationwide forest planning process for each of the 156 separate 
units of the National Forest System.”68  The forest plans resemble 
zoning maps, and they are used to divide all of the National 
Forests into different “Management Areas.”69  Forest plans also 
contain many procedural “standards and guidelines that control 
the types of activity that may occur”70 within each Management 
Area.  Some areas are zoned for “wildlife winter range, riparian 
areas, semi-primitive recreation, and timber production/wildlife,” 
in addition to other uses.71
Contrary to what one might expect, the Forest Service has 
long considered livestock grazing a legitimate and reasonable 
use.
  One of those other uses happens to be 
livestock grazing. 
72  Since 1897, Congress has allowed the Forest Service to 
control the permits, herd size, allotments, and season of use in 
order to prevent any monopolization of rangeland by large 
commercial grazing operations.73 Current Forest Service 
regulations recognize that it continues to be the “policy of 
Congress that the National Forests are established and shall be 
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, 
and wildlife and fish purposes,”74 and that the policy requires 
that the Forest Service “develop, administer and protect the 
range resources and permit and regulate the grazing use of all 
kinds and classes of livestock on all National Forest System lands 
and on other lands under Forest Service control.”75
 
 66. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 59. 
  Currently, 
the Forest Service divides land available for grazing into 
 67. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2006). 
 68. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 58, at 65. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Rangelands, Why does the forest 
service permit livestock grazing on NFS land?, http://www.fs.fed.us/range 
lands/uses/allowgrazing.shtml (last visited on Oct. 26, 2009). 
 73. Id. (citing WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, FOREST SERVICE GRAZING AND RANGE-
LANDS: A HISTORY  (1985)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. 36 C.F.R. § 222.1(a) (2009). 
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“Grazing Allotments”76 and permits grazing on them only after 
the development of an “Allotment Management Plan” (AMA).77  
These plans “prescribe the manner in and extent to which 
livestock operations will be conducted in order to meet the 
multiple-use, sustained yield, economic, and other needs and 
objectives as determined for the lands involved.”78  Each AMA 
takes into account what uses are both appropriate and feasible, 
and any subsequent grazing is “planned and managed taking into 
consideration all the other uses of the area.”79
III.  ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR 
INTERESTS IN PUBLIC RANGELAND 
 
Because of the perceived environmental damage caused by 
overgrazing, many organizations have formed to promote healthy 
grassland ecosystems by litigating issues involving grazing 
leases.  These organizations operate predominately in the 
western U.S. where overgrazing is most prevalent.  Especially 
successful organizations include WildEarth Guardians, the 
Western Watersheds Project, the Center for Biological Diversity, 
and the Oregon Natural Desert Association. 
A.  Rangeland Protection Organizations 
WildEarth Guardians is a nonprofit organization based out of 
Santa Fe, New Mexico.80  Once known as Forest Guardians, it 
merged with Sinapu, another regional environmental organiz-
ation, and changed its name in 2008.81  The new organizational 
structure enabled WildEarth Guardians to expand its activities to 
areas in the western U.S. outside of Arizona and New Mexico,82
 
 76. Id. § 222.2(a). 
 
and it now maintains offices in Arizona, Montana, Colorado, and 
 77. Id. § 222.2(b). 
 78. Id. § 222.1(a)(2)(i). 
 79. Id. 
 80. WildEarth Guardians, Meet Our Staff, http://www.wildearthguardians. 
org/AboutUs/MeetOurStaff/tabid/95/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 81. WildEarth Guardians, Conservation Groups Merge to Create a Force for 
the American West’s Wild Places, Wildlife, and Wild Rivers, http://www.wild 
earthguardians.org/library/paper.asp?nMode=1&nLibraryID=590 (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2009). 
 82. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/10
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California.83  WildEarth Guardians, in its mission statement, 
purports to “[protect] and [restore] wildlife, wild rivers, and wild 
places in the American West.”84 WildEarth Guardians’ wildlife 
program aims to “[prevent] extinction and [promote] recovery of 
imperiled native plants and animals in the West,”85 and the 
organization advocates federal endangered species listing for 
those species at risk because of habitat loss caused by “logging, 
mining, livestock grazing, [and] oil and gas extraction.”86  
WildEarth Guardians monitors federally listed species to ensure 
that any protective measures are effective.87  The organization’s 
wild places program is dedicated to protecting “public and private 
land from destruction and restores previously damaged areas 
throughout the West.”88
The Western Watersheds Project (WWP) is a “non-profit 
conservation group founded in 1993 with 2000 members and field 
offices in Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona and 
California.”
 
89  WWP began as the Idaho Watersheds Project 
(IWP) and is based in Hailey, Idaho.90  IWP was so successful in 
grazing lease litigation in Idaho during the 1990’s that it changed 
its name to WWP and expanded operations to other states.  The 
organization’s goal is to “influence and improve public lands 
management in [eight] western states with a primary focus on 
the negative impacts of livestock grazing on 250,000,000 acres of 
western public lands.”91
 
 83. WildEarth Guardians, Meet Our Staff, supra note 80. 
  To accomplish this goal, WWP has 
actively participated with WildEarth Guardians, the Center for 
Biological Diversity, and the Oregon Natural Desert Association 
 84. WildEarth Guardians, WildEarth Guardians, http://www.wildearthguard 
ians.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 85. WildEarth Guardians, Wildlife, http://www.wildearthguardians.org/Wild 
life/tabid/66/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. WildEarth Guardians, Wild Places, http://www.wildearthguardians.org/ 
WildPlaces/tabid/72/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 89. Western Watersheds Project, About WWP, Mission and Partnerships, 
http://westernwatersheds.org/about (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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in jointly bringing lawsuits to prevent overgrazing and grazing 
lease awards for individuals that habitually permit overgrazing.92
The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is a non-profit 
membership organization based in Tucson, Arizona.
 
93  It has 
approximately 200,000 active members94 and has field offices in 
Alaska, California, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.95  CBD has used 
evidence of “cattle-grazing abuses on the public lands where they 
lived” to obtain judicial orders to “remove cows from hundreds of 
miles of vulnerable desert streams” in order to protect species like 
the southwestern willow flycatcher.96  CBD also successfully 
ended “major timber operations through-out Arizona and New 
Mexico and brought an end to large-scale industrial logging in the 
heritage public lands of the arid Southwest” in order to protect 
threatened goshawks and owls.97
Finally, the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA) is a 
“1,200-member grassroots organization”
 
98 that works to protect 
and restore the biological integrity of Oregon’s desert 
ecosystems.99  This has been accomplished by advocating that 
desert ecosystems receive congressional wilderness designations 
and protection pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964.100  When 
the BLM refuses to propose such designations, ONDA litigates to 
force the issue.101
 
 
 
 92. Id. See also Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 93. Center for Biological Diversity, About the Center, Contact Us, http://www 
.biologicaldiversity.org/about/contact/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 94. Center for Biological Diversity, Support, Support the Center, http://www. 
biologicaldiversity.org/support/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 95. Center for Biological Diversity, About the Center, Contact Us, supra note 
93. 
 96. Center for Biological Diversity, About the Center, Our Story, http://www. 
biologicaldiversity.org/about/story/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Oregon Natural Desert Association, About Us, http://www.onda.org/about 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006). 
 101. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 451 F.Supp.2d 
1202 (D. Or. 2006) [hereinafter ONDA v. Rasmussen]. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/10
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B. Environmental Organization Interests in Public 
Rangeland 
Rangeland protection organizations consider overgrazing 
such a problem because it greatly damages grassland flora and 
fauna.  For CBD, the increased defoliation and plant tramp-ling 
that leads to soil erosion and water sedimentation threatens 
many species of grassland herbivores, avian predators, and 
fish.102  For ONDA, overgrazing damages an already delicate 
high desert ecosystem.103  Overgrazing depletes desert grasses 
and vegetation, and the lack of moisture serves as an impediment 
to their quick renewal.104  Once the vegetation is removed, what 
little nutrients exist in the soil are quickly lost to wind erosion.105  
For some organizations like WildEarth Guardians, the interest in 
overgrazing is twofold: (1) prevent loss of habitat for native flora 
and fauna; and (2) prevent the degradation of a resource designed 
and dedicated to the continuing maintenance of public schools.106
If overgrazing is such a major environmental problem, one 
might ask why ranchers and ranching organizations allow it to 
happen since it affects them too.  There is no easy answer, but the 
principles outlined in the “Tragedy of the Commons” concept may 
explain why ranchers and ranching organizations have allowed 
overgrazing.
 
107
 
 102. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing, 
supra note 11; see generally NAT’L RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL & EARTHJUSTICE, 
LIVESTOCK GRAZING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (2009), http://www.earthjustice. 
org/library/factsheets/grazing_enviro_effects.pdf. 
  There are vast acreages of public land in the 
 103. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing, 
supra note 11.  
 104. Id. 
 105. NAT’L RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRIC., RANGELAND 
SOIL QUALITY—WIND EROSION 2 (2001), http://soils. usda.gov/SQI/management/ 
files/RSQIS10.pdf. 
 106. See generally Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001); see also Idaho 
Watersheds Project v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 982 P.2d 367 (Idaho 1999) 
[hereinafter IWP II]. 
 107. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243, 1243-48 (1968). The “Tragedy of the Commons” is a process by which 
multiple individuals will independently and rationally act in their own interests 
to destroy a finite public resource, even if this destruction damages everyone in 
the long-term. Id. 
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western U.S.,108 so ranchers may believe that they could always 
move their herds onto another grazing allotment if the one they 
use becomes overgrazed and can no longer sustain large herds.109  
Because the ranchers do not own the public land, there may be no 
real incentive to prevent degradation.110
IV.  GRAZING LEASE LITIGATION PROBLEM 
 
Even though overgrazing is a serious environmental problem, 
rangeland protection organizations’ litigation to take grazing 
leases away from those who allow overgrazing has arguably 
become a bigger problem because it has created a public relations 
nightmare.111 On state owned rangeland, environmental 
organizations have litigated to prevent overgrazing and to ensure 
that school-trust land is healthy enough to support the public 
schools into the distant future.112  On BLM land, ranching 
organizations have litigated furiously to prevent any reform of 
federal rangeland management, and environmental organizations 
have responded with lawsuits to remove livestock to protect 
ecosystem health.113 Finally, on Forest Service land, 
environmental organizations have litigated to simply prevent any 
grazing leases from going to ranchers who overgraze.114
 
 108. See Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, About 
the BLM, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM.html (last visited Oct. 
26, 2009); see U.S. Forest Service, Why does the forest service permit livestock 
grazing on NFS land?, supra note 71. 
 
 109. Hardin, supra note 107, at 2. 
 110. Id. at 2. 
 111. See generally ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16. 
 112. Id. See, e.g., Press Release, WildEarth Guardians, Cattle Grazing on 
Public Lands Must Account for Endangered Wildlife: 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals Sides with Conservationists (June 20, 2006), available at http://www. 
wildearthguardians.org/library/paper.asp?nMode=1&nLibraryID=356; see also 
Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001). 
 113. See generally Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000) 
[hereinafter Public Lands Council III]. 
 114. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114 
(9th Cir. 2008); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, No. Civ. 05-0372 
JBDJS, 2005 WL 3663717 (D. N.M. Dec. 13, 2005). 
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A.  Arizona School-Trust Land Grazing Litigation 
In Arizona, environmental organizations historically have 
not had much success in preventing ranchers’ livestock from 
overgrazing on school-trust land.115  This pattern of failure116 
changed dramatically in 2001 with the landmark Arizona 
Supreme Court ruling in Guardians v. Wells.117  In this case, 
Forest Guardians and Jonathan Tate applied for two different 
grazing leases of school-trust land.  Forest Guardians applied for 
a “ten-year lease on approximately 5,000 acres of school-trust 
grazing land” in Coconino County, Arizona, and 162 acres in 
Santa Cruz County, which was at the other end of the state.118  
Tate applied for almost 16,000 acres of school-trust grazing land 
in Pinal County, Arizona, north of Tucson.119  Both Forest 
Guardians and Tate offered to pay double the amount offered by 
the then-current lessees when the leases came up for renewal.120  
Both parties informed the Commissioner of the SLD that the 
leased land would not be grazed; instead, it would be “rested” for 
the entire period of the lease so that it could recover from 
apparent overgrazing by the then-current and previous lessees.121  
The Commissioner subsequently denied both of these 
applications.122  After an arduous appeals process, the Arizona 
Supreme Court concluded that the Commissioner had ignored his 
constitutional duty to consider whether the high bids were in the 
best interest of the trust123 and determined that environmental 
organizations in Arizona could bid on and be awarded grazing 
leases with the intention of letting the land rest for the entirety of 
the lease.124
 
 115. Guardians, 34 P.3d at 364. 
 
 116. Id. at 366. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 366-77 (Ariz. 2001). 
 122. Id. at 367. 
 123. Id. at 372. 
 124. Id. at 371-73. 
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B.  Idaho Public School Land Endowment Grazing 
Litigation 
The environmental litigation over grazing leases in Idaho is 
much more complicated than that in Arizona.  IWP and later 
WWP have undertaken much of the litigation.125  In Idaho, 
litigation over grazing leases on public school land functionally 
began in 1993.126  On Sept. 23 of that year, rancher William E. 
Ingram filed an application with the Idaho SBLC to renew his 
640-acre grazing lease.127  At the same time, IWP filed an 
application to lease the same land subdivision.128  After a 
contentious auctioning process, in which IWP was the high-bidder 
for the lease, the SBLC awarded the lease to Ingram.129  IWP 
appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court eventually held that the 
SBLC failed to “provide for the location, protection, sale, or rental 
of all the lands . . . in such manner as will secure the maximum 
long-term financial return to the institution to which granted or 
to the state if not specifically granted.”130  The court also used the 
legislature’s authority, as granted by Section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution, and case law to determine that any bids on grazing 
leases must be for the “greatest possible amount for the lease of 
school lands for the benefit of school funds.”131  Subsequently, the 
court reversed the decision of the SBLC and ordered that new bid 
auctions take place so that the high-bidder could be awarded the 
lease.132
In 1999, IWP was again involved in litigation because it was 
prevented from bidding on grazing leases.
 
133
 
 125. See Western Watersheds Project, WWP Litigation, http://westernwater 
sheds.org/legal/legal.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
  After IWP’s victory 
in 1996, the Idaho Legislature amended the Idaho Code by 
adding a provision that required that the SBLC weigh the benefit 
 126. IWP I, supra note 14, at 1206. 
 127. Id. at 1207. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1208. 
 130. Id. at 1209 (quoting IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8). 
 131. Id. at 1209-10 (citing IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8, also citing East Side 
Blaine County Livestock Ass’n v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 198 P. 760 (Idaho 
1921). 
 132. IWP I, supra note 14, at 1211-12. 
 133. IWP II, supra note 106, at 367-69. 
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of lease bids for the schools, the state’s interest in a healthy 
ranching industry, and the increased tax revenue from such 
industry.134  The Idaho Supreme Court held that this provision 
was unconstitutional with Article IX, Section 8 of the state 
constitution135 and ordered that new auctions be held so that 
IWP could participate.136
C.  BLM Litigation 
 
Grazing lease litigation on BLM land took a markedly 
different path from comparable litigation on state rangeland 
because BLM is a federal agency.  On BLM land, ranching 
organizations brought roughly half of the major lawsuits in 
response to federal rangeland regulatory reforms.  Environmental 
organizations brought lawsuits largely in response to the 
eventual failure of these regulatory reforms and focused on 
removing livestock from BLM land that the organizations 
believed should receive wilderness designations.  In order to 
understand why the litigation occurred, one must be thoroughly 
familiar with the rangeland management reform process 
undertaken during the 1990s. 
1.  Rangeland Reform ’94 
Although Congress passed both FLPMA137 and PRIA138 in 
order to improve rangeland management, these Acts were only 
modestly successful.  The BLM has consistently “failed to exercise 
its modest authority to limit the ecological damage inflicted by 
intensive grazing.”139
 
 134. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-310B(2)(a) (2008), invalidated by IWP II, supra 
note 106. 
  In 1993, the Clinton Administration 
Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, attempted to address 
this continuing environmental damage through the development 
 135. IWP II, supra note 106, at 369. 
 136. Id. at 371. 
 137. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1787 (2006). 
 138. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 
(2006). 
 139. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 50-51. 
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of Rangeland Reform ’94,140 the “first significant proposal to 
reform grazing practices since the enactment of PRIA in 1978.”141  
Rangeland Reform ’94 was designed to implement regulations 
whereby domestic livestock would be “managed to minimize their 
detrimental impact on federal rangeland.”142  The proposed 
regulatory changes purported “(1) to improve administration of 
the BLM grazing program, (2) to restore and improve the 
ecological condition of the rangeland, and (3) to establish a ‘fair 
and equitable grazing fee.’”143  Rangeland Reform ’94’s proposed 
implementation of national standards and guidelines were 
designed to ensure that “grazing did not interfere with properly 
functioning ecosystems,”144 and the proposed increase in grazing 
fees “attempted to establish a fee structure that would result, 
over the course of three years, in a fee that more closely 
represented the fair market value of the forage on federal 
land.”145
Ranchers and ranching organizations reacted negatively to 
the proposed reforms
 
146 and believed that they would end private 
grazing on BLM land.147  Babbitt successfully negotiated a 
compromise with Congressional Democrats in order to pass 
Rangeland Reform ’94 as part of an appropriations bill.148  
Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives easily passed the 
bill, but western Senators, frustrated and angered by the 
proposed regulations, “successfully filibustered and prevented the 
Senate from considering the range reforms attached to [it].”149  
On November 9, 1993, the western Senators removed the 
rangeland reforms from the appropriations bill, and Babbitt was 
forced to pursue an administrative reform solution.150
 
 140. Id. at 52. 
 
 141. Id. at 52-53. 
 142. Id. at 59-60. 
 143. Id. at 62. 
 144. Id. at 64. 
 145. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 65. 
 146. See Valerie Richardson, Babbitt's “Green” Policies Provoke Anger in West, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at A1. 
 147. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 66. 
 148. Id. at 66-7. 
 149. Id. at 67. 
 150. Id. 
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The BLM promulgated the proposed administrative 
rangeland reform regulations on March 25, 1994, in a somewhat 
weaker form than they had appeared in the defeated legislative 
effort.151  After extensive public comment, the BLM promulgated 
the final rangeland reform regulations on February 22, 1995.152  
The final regulations were quite different than the proposed 
rules.  First, the “proposed grazing-fee increase was eliminated 
from the final version.”153  In addition, the effective date of the 
regulations was delayed by six months, ensuring that “[they] 
would not apply to the 1995 grazing season.”154  This meant that 
ranchers and ranching associations had almost a year to 
persuade the friendlier Republican Congress to pass a legislative 
override of the rangeland reform regulations.155  However, the 
Fundamentals of Rangeland Health (FRH), a key component of 
Rangeland Reform ’94,156 were part of the final regulations.  The 
FRH allowed the BLM to “modify grazing practices” to restore 
and protect proper watershed function, endangered species 
habitat, and ecological processes.157  Finally, “the authorized 
officer [would] take appropriate action”158 whenever “ecological 
conditions [were] not being met.”159  After prospects faded for a 
legislative override of the rangeland reform regulations,160 
ranching interests prepared to overturn them through the 
judiciary.161
2.  Ranching Organization Litigation Over 
 
 
 151. Id. at 70; see also Grazing Administration—Exclusive of Alaska, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 14,314 (proposed Mar. 25, 1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4, 1780, 
4100). 
 152. See Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 9894 (proposed Feb. 22, 1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 1780, 4100). 
 153. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 73. 
 154. Id. at 74. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Public Lands Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior Sec’y, 929 F. Supp. 1436, 
1448 (D. Wyo. 1996) [hereinafter Public Lands Council I]; see also Adminis-
tration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9898 (Feb. 
22, 1995); see also 43 C.F.R § 4180.1 (1995). 
 158. 43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (1995). 
 159. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 75. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 75-76. 
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Regulatory Reform 
The Public Lands Council, a ranching association, and 
several other grazing organizations filed suit against Babbitt in 
order to declare that ten provisions of the rangeland reform 
regulations were an arbitrary and capricious exercise of Babbitt’s 
authority as Secretary of the Interior.162  The District Court in 
Wyoming upheld six of the ten challenged provisions—including 
the FRH provision—as valid exercises of Babbitt’s statutory 
authority163 under the TGA.164  Babbitt appealed to the Tenth 
Circuit, which held that three of the four provisions ruled 
unconstitutional by the District Court were, in fact, also valid 
exercises of his authority.165  When Public Lands Council 
appealed to the Supreme Court, the court “unanimously rejected 
[the appeal] and affirmed the Tenth Circuit.”166
3.  Environmental Organization Litigation Over 
BLM Grazing Rights 
  After nearly five 
years of litigation, almost all of the Rangeland Reform ‘94 
regulations went fully into effect on May 15, 2000—just a few 
months before President Clinton left office.  As will be discussed 
in greater detail in Section V(C) below, these regulations were 
eventually overturned during the George W. Bush 
Administration. 
Since the failure of Rangeland Reform ‘94, environmental 
organizations like ONDA and WWP have attempted to meet the 
principles outlined in the FRH through litigation to remove 
livestock from portions of BLM land.167  In Oregon Natural Desert 
Association v. Bureau of Land Management,168
 
 162. Public Lands Council III, supra note 113, at 744, 748, 750, 752; see Nicoll, 
supra note 44, at 76. 
 ONDA filed a 
 163. See generally Public Lands Council I, supra note 157, at 1451. 
 164. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (2006). 
 165. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter Public Lands Council II]. 
 166. Nicoll, supra, note 44, at 787; See Public Lands Council III, supra note 
113, at 750. 
 167. See generally ONDA v. Rasmussen I, supra note 101, at 1202; see also 
Western Watersheds Project v. Bennett, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (D. Id. 
2005). 
 168. ONDA v. Rasmussen I, supra note 101. 
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lawsuit against the BLM, the Secretary of the Interior, and 
several local BLM managers to stop a proposed riparian 
remediation construction project on BLM rangeland in Oregon.169  
In 1998, the BLM determined that the East-West Gulch in the 
Beaty Butte Allotment was “failing to meet federal rangeland 
health standards.”170  The BLM concluded, however, that 
livestock grazing in the area did not significantly affect the 
declining rangeland health.171  The BLM subsequently developed 
an action plan that was designed to restore the East-West Gulch 
through the construction of a series of livestock improvements 
and road relocation from the riparian floodplain to a nearby 
ridge.172  ONDA objected to the construction and preferred that 
livestock grazing be reduced or ended as an alternative method 
for riparian restoration.173  ONDA performed a wilderness 
inventory of the area pursuant to agency protocols, determined 
that multiple wilderness resources might be jeopardized by the 
construction projects, and submitted it to the BLM.  When the 
BLM refused to alter or halt the action plan, ONDA filed suit.  
Important to this comment is ONDA’s contention that the BLM 
violated its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)174 
requirements when it “did not consider the full range of 
alternatives to its proposed action”175 and when it “failed to 
consider new information on wilderness resources.”176  The 
District Court held that the BLM was “obligated under NEPA to 
consider whether there were changes in, or additions to, the 
wilderness values within the East-West Gulch and whether the 
proposed action in that area might negatively impact those 
wilderness values.”177
 
 169. Id. at 1205, 1207. 
  However, the District Court also ruled 
that the BLM had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner by not considering in greater detail the reduction of 
 170. Id. at 1206. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1207. 
 173. Id. 
 174. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 
(2006). 
 175. ONDA v. Rasmussen I, supra note 101, at 1207. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1213. 
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grazing in the East-West Gulch.178  Once the District Court had 
ruled in its favor, however, ONDA was able to request and receive 
a judicial stay on any additional BLM construction in the East-
West Gulch until such time as a proper environmental 
assessment and wilderness inventory had been performed.179
D.  U.S. Forest Service Litigation 
  
This meant that in a new assessment and inventory, the BLM 
could potentially consider reduction in livestock grazing as an 
alternative method for riparian restoration that would preserve 
wilderness resources. 
Unlike that on state or BLM rangeland, environmental 
organization grazing lease litigation with regard to Forest Service 
land is often unsuccessful.180  Occasionally, however, environ-
mental organizations do find some success when pursuing 
Endangered Species Act (ESA)181 claims.  In Forest Guardians v. 
U.S. Forest Service,182 Forest Guardians brought suit against the 
Forest Service, alleging violations of the ESA for failure to adhere 
to a 1993 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) Recovery Plan for 
the threatened Mexican spotted owl183 in parts of eleven national 
forests in Arizona and New Mexico.184
 
 178. Id. at 1214. 
  In response to the FWS 
Recovery Plan, the Forest Service in 1996 “developed 
 179. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91648 
(D. Or. Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter ONDA v. Rasmussen II]. 
 180. See generally League of Wilderness Defenders v. U.S. Forest Serv., 549 
F.3d 1211 (D. Or. 2008) (holding that the Forest Service’s Final Environmental 
Impact Statement for allowing commercial logging adequately evaluated the 
cumulative effects of past and present grazing); see generally Oregon Natural 
Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
effluents from livestock were not a point source within the meaning of the Clean 
Water Act, and, therefore, no state certification was required for issuance of 
livestock grazing permit). 
 181. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
 182. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV 00-612-TUC-RCC, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25440 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2002). 
 183. Id. at *5. 
 184. Press Release, EarthJustice, Court Rules National Forest Grazing Illegal, 
Judge Rules National Forest Livestock Grazing Program in New Mexico and 
Arizona Threatens Mexican Spotted Owl, Violates ESA (Oct. 17, 2002), available 
at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/002/court_rules_national_forest_graz 
ing_illegal.html. 
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amendments . . . to their Forest Plans for the eleven national 
forests in the Southwest Region.”185  The amendments required 
that the Forest Service “monitor forage use by livestock and other 
animals in ‘key forage monitoring areas’ and to ensure that forage 
use does not exceed forage utilization standards during the 
growing season.”186  The Forest Service intended to modify its 
management practices prior to the 1996 amendments, so it 
consulted with the FWS in order to determine whether the new 
practices would negatively affect the owl.187  The FWS then 
issued two biological opinions whereby it determined that the 
1996 amendments would comply with the ESA and that the pre-
1996 practices would not.188
The District Court held that the Forest Service subsequently 
did not implement the standards outlined in the 1996 
amendments and was in violation of the ESA because it failed to 
alert the FWS that implementation would not proceed 
immediately.
 
189  Because the Forest Service was not in 
compliance with the ESA, the court subsequently ordered all 
livestock removed from the eleven national forests and ordered 
the Forest Service to “consult with the [FWS] to determine 
whether the federally protected owls need additional 
protections.”190
As demonstrated above, environmental organizations have 
achieved some great successes in removing or limiting livestock 
on state owned, BLM, and Forest Service rangeland.  Because of 
this success, grazing lease litigation has increased. As a result, 
the ranching industry, the public, and legislative bodies have 
developed an extremely negative perception of environmental 
organizations. 
 
 
 185. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25440, at 
*4 (D. Ariz, Oct. 16, 2002). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *5. 
 189. Id. at *21. 
 190. Press Release, Earthjustice, Court Orders Cows Off of Essential Mexican 
Spotted Owl Habitat, Southwest Cattle Grazing Harming Mexican Spotted 
Owls, (Nov. 26, 2002), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/002/ 
court_ orders_cows_off_of_essential_mexican_spotted_owl_habitat.html. 
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V.    REACTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS’ LITIGATION  
While reduction of overgrazing is a laudable goal, the 
litigation employed by rangeland protection organizations to 
achieve it has created a publicity nightmare.  Ranchers and other 
landowners have become increasingly hostile to the environ-
mental organizations’ interests and activities because they have 
been excluded from the public land they have used for 
generations, and the legislatures in several states have been 
pressured by ranching associations to help protect them from 
unwanted assault by environmental organizations.191  This 
pressure usually results in state legislatures passing either laws 
that make it financially more difficult for environmental 
organizations to outbid ranchers on grazing leases192 or 
constitutional amendments or laws that prevent environmental 
organizations’ bids from being considered in the first place.193
A.  Landowner Reaction 
  
Finally, ranching associations have pressured federal agencies 
like the BLM to dismantle much of the regulatory reform that 
enabled environmental organizations’ legal victories on federal 
rangeland. 
The ranchers who have lost grazing leases are understand-
ably very upset by environmental organizations’ success194 be-
cause their families generally have grazed their livestock for 
generations on public rangeland grazing leases.195  Ranchers 
have had to increase the size of their herds just to compete and 
earn a living.196
 
 191. Fairfax & Issod, supra note 36, at 359, 365. 
  Unfortunately, as described above, increasing 
 192. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-284(B) (2002), amended by 2002 Ariz. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 204 (West). 
 193. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-310B(2)(a) (2008), invalidated by IWP II, supra 
note 106. 
 194. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See generally Tim Heardan, Ranchers May Face Tough Times, CAPITAL 
PRESS, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.klamathbucketbrigade.org/Capital 
Press_Ranchersmayfacetoughtimes010909.htm. 
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herd size leads to overgrazing and rangeland degradation.197  
Often, the court-ordered removal of livestock from a grazing lease 
will jeopardize ranchers’ entire livelihoods.198  Once a court 
grants an environmental organization a legal victory as in 
Guardians v. Wells199 in Arizona, it sets a legal precedent that 
could cause more ranchers to lose their leases.200
B.  Legislative Reaction 
 
In Arizona, the SLD has sided with ranchers throughout its 
existence,201 and although the Arizona Supreme Court has since 
held that environmental organizations like WildEarth Guardians 
may bid on grazing leases, the decision has not radically changed 
the policies or preferences of the SLD.202  The court’s holding 
definitely did not change the “political environment in which the 
agency operates,” and the Arizona Legislature is “even more 
adverse to change than [the SLD].”203  In 2002, the legislature 
amended several sections of the Arizona Revised Statutes in 
response to Guardians v. Wells204 so that successful bidders have 
to pay for improvements installed by previous lessees.205
 
 197. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Association, Public Lands Grazing, 
supra note 11; see generally General Concepts Related to Overgrazing, 
http://people.oregonstate.edu/~muirp/genconce.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2009); 
see generally NAT’L RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL & EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 102, 
at 1; see generally NAT’L RES. CONSERVATION SERV., RANGELAND SOIL QUALITY—
WIND EROSION, supra note 105, at 1. 
  For 
environmental organizations like WildEarth Guardians, this 
legislation presents a problem with bidding on grazing leases 
because the improvements can be prohibitively expensive and 
 198. See Scotta Callister, Ranchers Seek Smith’s Help in Grazing Battle, BLUE 
MOUNTAIN EAGLE, Aug. 20, 2008, at 1-2. 
 199. Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001). 
 200. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16, at 2. 
 201. Fairfax & Issod, supra note 36, at 359. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. An Act Amending Sections 37-284, 37-322.01 and 37-322.03, 2002 Ariz. 
Legis. Serv. Ch. 204 (S.B. 1274) (West); Fairfax & Issod, supra note 36, at 359; 
Guardians, 34 P.3d at 364. 
 205. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-284(C) (2002), amended by 2002 Ariz. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 204 (West). 
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make it impossible to obtain the lease.206  If an environmental 
organization is not able to pay for the cost of non-removable 
improvements installed by the previous lessee, then the lease is 
awarded to the next best bidder, which would be the other party 
contesting the lease—the current lessee.207
As mentioned above, the Idaho Legislature amended the 
Idaho Code to prevent organizations like IWP from obtaining 
grazing leases in order to let the land “rest.”
 
208  After the Idaho 
SBLC used this provision to reject IWP’s grazing lease high bid 
for the second time, IWP was forced to file another lawsuit to 
acquire the lease.209  The Idaho Legislature adopted a resolution 
in 1998 that proposed to amend the section of the Idaho 
Constitution that allowed IWP to prevail in 1996.  The 
amendment changed the word “disposal” in the section to “sale” in 
reference to the disposition of trust lands in Section 8.210  This 
changed the whole meaning of the sentence upon which the Idaho 
Supreme Court relied in its 1996 decision—the new language 
would prevent the legislature from stipulating that the school-
trust land could be leased in such a way so that it could provide a 
benefit to the schools.211  Once restricted to sales alone, IWP and 
other like-minded environmental organizations would no longer 
be able to apply for and be awarded grazing leases under Section 
8 of the state constitution.212  Idaho voters approved this 
amendment in the general election of November 3, 1998.213  
However, the court overturned the amendment because of a 
procedural technicality,214
 
 206. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-284(C), 37-322, 37-322.01, 37-
322.02, 37-322.03 (2008). 
 and the legislature has not yet acted to 
readopt it. 
 207. See ARIZ. CATTLEMEN’S ASS’N, BIDDING WARS, supra note 16, at 2. 
 208. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-310B(2)(a) (2008), invalidated by IWP II, supra 
note 106. 
 209. Id. at 370-71. 
 210. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8 (amended 1998), invalidated by Idaho Water-
sheds Project v. State Bd. Land Comm’rs, 982 P.2d 358 (Idaho 1999) [hereinafter 
IWP III]. 
 211. IWP I, supra note 14, at 1209. 
 212. See generally IWP III, supra note 210. 
 213. Id. at 360. 
 214. IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 2 (providing that “[i]f two (2) or more amend-
ments are proposed, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors 
shall vote for or against each of them separately”). 
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C.  Agency Reaction to BLM Grazing Reform 
The inauguration of George W. Bush on January 20, 2001 
marked the end of Rangeland Reform ‘94.  Even though Public 
Lands Council v. Babbitt III215 had been decided only a few 
months before, President Bush campaigned on a platform 
“promising to limit the federal government’s intrusion into 
extraction activities.”216  On January 30, 2003, BLM Director 
Kathleen Clarke promised to rewrite the BLM grazing 
regulations.217  When the BLM promulgated its final regulations 
on July 12, 2006,218 it undid almost all of the reform instituted in 
1995.219  In particular, the BLM modified the FRH guidelines so 
that they “no longer have any direct effect on the management of 
BLM rangeland.”220
VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS INVOLVING 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
  In effect, grazing practices and regulations 
exist as they did prior to Babbitt’s efforts at reform. 
Because grazing lease litigation by environmental 
organizations has created such negative reactions from 
landowners, legislatures, and federal agencies, the only effective 
way to solve the problem is to reduce the amount of litigation.  
One way to achieve this goal is through Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR), whereby “a neutral third party participates to 
assist in the resolution of issues in controversy, through processes 
such as early neutral evaluation, mediation, mini-trial, and 
arbitration.”221  When used to resolve environmental disputes, 
however, ADR has also been referred to as Environmental 
Conflict Resolution, or ECR.222
 
 215. Public Lands Council III, supra note 113. 
  Because environmental and 
ranching organizations have been especially litigious in 
 216. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 97. 
 217. Id. at 98. 
 218. See Administration of Livestock Grazing—Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 39,402 (July 12, 2006) (to be codified 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100). 
 219. Nicoll, supra note 44, at 99. 
 220. Id. at 105. 
 221. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (2006). 
 222. Joseph A. Siegel, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental 
Enforcement Cases: A Call for Enhanced Assessment and Greater Use, 24 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 189 (2007).  
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attempting to resolve grazing lease disputes223 and because the 
litigation itself takes years to reach completion,224 ADR is an 
efficient avenue for conflict resolution.225  ADR has worked to 
resolve major environmental disputes between a wide variety of 
stakeholders, and it can work with parties regarding grazing 
lease disputes as well.226
A.  Environmental Disputes Resolved Through ADR 
  Therefore, state legislatures and 
Congress should enact laws that authorize and encourage grazing 
lease disputes to be funneled into ADR systems, and the BLM 
and Forest Service should renew their commitment to negotiated 
rulemaking so that ADR is again emphasized for agency 
rulemaking and adjudication. 
ADR has been used successfully to resolve a number of 
environmental disputes, and it is often used when resolving land 
use conflicts.227  In these types of conflicts, multiple stakeholders, 
each with different concerns and objectives, are usually involved. 
Because of the sheer number of differing objectives among the 
parties, litigation can be both time-consuming and costly.228  
However, by using ADR, stakeholders are generally able to 
reduce both litigation time and legal expense.229  For example, in 
a dispute over a proposed dam on the Snoqualmie River in 
Washington, “environmental advocates opposed the project be-
cause of their concern over the survival of the river’s ecosystem; 
farmers were concerned about proposed reductions in water for 
irrigation; and citizens worried about the potential for 
uncontrolled suburban sprawl.”230
 
 223. See Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364 (Ariz. 2001); see also IWP I, supra 
note 14, at 1206; see IWP II, supra note 106, at 367; see also Public Lands 
Council III, supra note 113, at 728. 
  Instead of litigation, the 
 224. See, e.g., IWP I, supra note 14, at 1206; see also IWP II, supra note 106, at 
367. 
 225. See Siegel, supra note 222, at 197. 
 226. See John R. Nolon & Jessica Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning: The 
Role of Lawyers in Resolving Environmental Interest Disputes, Contexts for 
Resolving Environmental Interest Conflicts and Disputes, 37 REAL EST. L. J. 73, 
76 (2008). 
 227. Id. at 76, 77. 
 228. See Siegel, supra note 222, at 197. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See Nolon & Bacher, supra note 226, at 76. 
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parties agreed to mediation by two facilitators,231 and “the 
parties implemented many of the land use recommendations that 
were agreed upon and formed a basin-wide coordinating council 
that continued operating for ten years.”232  In Southern 
California, urban sprawl and development threatened to impair 
or eliminate the last of the “coastal sage scrub habitat, [which 
was] vital to the survival of a number of species endemic to the 
area.” Utilizing a voluntary Natural Communities Conservation 
Planning (NCCP) scheme, developers, landowners, and local 
officials successfully created a development plan that set aside 
“large core habitat reserves and wildlife corridors” and set “tough 
development limits” in buffer areas around protected habitat 
cores.233  While this land use dispute did not come to litigation, 
the parties recognized that “legal proceedings would likely be too 
rigid, time consuming, costly, and inadequate” to resolve the 
conflict.234
B.  State and Federal Statutory Schemes 
  As these examples show, ADR can effectively and 
efficiently resolve environmental disputes, and, therefore, it 
should be used to resolve grazing lease disputes as well. 
 As explained above, most grazing lease litigation in state 
courts occurs because of disputes over the school-trust 
endowment land granted to states when they were admitted into 
the U.S.  Because Congress has no police power, it cannot force 
the individual states to adopt and enforce statutes that require 
ADR in all grazing lease litigation.235  However, Congress could 
encourage states to enact such legislation through its spending 
power236 and could condition receipt of funds for a national 
project on such enactment.237
 
 231. Id. 
  Furthermore, the fundamental 
 232. Id. at 76-77. 
 233. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Legal and Natural 
Destabilizations and the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811, 816 
(2008).  
 234. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on 
Collaborative Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 NEV. L.J. 835, 841 
(2008). 
 235. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9. 
 236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 237. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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right to justice would be frustrated if states forced parties to 
grazing lease conflicts into ADR.238
However, a state statutory scheme promoting and 
encouraging parties to mediate grazing lease conflicts could be 
established.  Under such a scheme, a state legislature would craft 
a bill authorizing ADR in its courts in a manner similar
 
239 to the 
authorization in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 
(ADR Act).240
A statutory scheme for the federal courts might not be as 
difficult to establish as it would be in the individual states.  
Congress already has an ADR Act,
  The legislature could then draft the statute so that 
there were positive incentives for parties to utilize ADR processes 
like mediation, arbitration, and binding arbitration.  The 
incentives could be: drastically reduced court fees and processing 
time, immediate access to a qualified official mediator or arbiter, 
or even a stipend, tax write-off, or other financial bonus directed 
to the parties in exchange for their use of an ADR solution 
instead of insisting on a trial.  The same could be done with 
negative financial incentives to prevent parties from choosing 
trial over the ADR system, but these might be more difficult to 
enact and enforce than positive incentives.  While some of these 
strategies—especially that of the negative financial incentive to 
participate in ADR—may be difficult to enact, the benefits of a 
less-cluttered case docket and less hostility between 
environmental organizations and ranching interests may 
outweigh any potential legislative difficulties. 
241 so ADR has been 
authorized and encouraged in federal courts.242
 
 238. See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
  It would be a 
relatively simple matter to amend the ADR Act to include the 
same positive and negative incentives outlined above to 
encourage parties to grazing lease litigation to use the ADR 
system already in place.  However, grazing lease litigation is 
generally only a problem in the western U.S., and 
Representatives and Senators from the rest of the country might 
be disinclined to vote for such an amendment.  Political ideologies 
could also come into play just as they did in the legislative defeat 
 239. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (2006). 
 240. Id. §§ 651-58. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. § 651(a). 
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of Rangeland Reform ‘94.  The best method for passage would 
involve compromise on both sides of the political spectrum.  
Proponents of the legislation might need to assure conservative 
members that it is intended to reduce court costs and clear the 
court dockets, not to deny ranchers’ rights or abilities to graze on 
public rangeland, and proponents should also assure liberal 
members that the legislation would not remove or hamper 
environmental organizations’ ability to stop ecological damage 
caused by overgrazing. 
C.  Renewed Agency Commitment to Negotiated 
Rulemaking 
During the 1980’s, federal agencies like the BLM and Forest 
Service embraced negotiated rulemaking, which is sometimes 
called “regulatory negotiation” or “reg-neg,” as an “alternative to 
traditional procedures for drafting proposed regulations.”243  
Under negotiated rulemaking, “the agency, with the assistance of 
one or more neutral advisers known as ‘convenors,’ assembles a 
committee of representatives of all affected interests to negotiate 
a proposed rule . . . to reach consensus on a text that all parties 
can accept.”244  Therefore, negotiated rulemaking is a method by 
which agencies can avoid much of the conflict between parties 
affected by the rule and the subsequent litigation they use to 
obtain relief.245 Unfortunately, even though negotiated rule-
making is supported and encouraged by the Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act of 1990,246 federal agencies have used it with 
much less frequency over the past decade because of declining 
budgets and agency reorganization during the George W. Bush 
Administration, among other factors.247  Generally, agencies no 
longer voluntarily use negotiated rulemaking.248
 
 243. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) 
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987 (2008). 
  Because 
regulations governing grazing on BLM and Forest Service land 
have proven to be very contentious, reestablishing and increasing 
 244. Id. at 988. 
 245. Id. at 991. 
 246. Id. at 989; Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561-570 (2006). 
 247. See Lubbers, supra note 243, at 996-1005. 
 248. Id. at 1004. 
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negotiated rulemaking in these agencies could significantly 
reduce grazing lease litigation by bringing environmental 
organizations and ranching interests together to draft grazing 
regulations that protect both rangeland health and the ranching 
way of life. 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Grazing lease litigation is a pervasive problem in the western 
U.S., and environmental organizations have seen great success in 
wresting grazing leases away from ranchers.  However, this has 
created a public relations nightmare and has provoked strong 
legislative and regulatory reactions against environmental 
organizations. Efforts to reform the public grazing system to 
promote rangeland health have failed, and no viable solution 
currently exists.  Rangeland Reform ’94 was too limited and 
watered-down to effectuate the change necessary to prevent the 
grazing lease cases from clogging western court dockets.  A 
Rangeland Reform ’10 legislative package of amendments to the 
ADR Act to implement the state and federal statutory schemes 
outlined in this comment combined with a renewed agency 
commitment to negotiated rulemaking could result in an end to 
grazing lease litigation, as we have known it. 
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